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NASA’s Phoenix Mars Lander began its journey to Mars from Cape Canaveral, Florida 
in August 2007, but its journey to the launch pad began many years earlier in 1997 as 
NASA’s Mars Surveyor Program 2001 Lander.  In the intervening years, the entry, descent 
and landing (EDL) system architecture went through a series of changes, resulting in the 
system flown to the surface of Mars on May 25th, 2008.  Some changes, such as entry 
velocity and landing site elevation, were the result of differences in mission design.  Other 
changes, including the removal of hypersonic guidance, the reformulation of the parachute 
deployment algorithm, and the addition of the backshell avoidance maneuver, were driven 
by constant efforts to augment system robustness.  An overview of the Phoenix EDL system 
architecture is presented along with rationales driving these architectural changes.  
Nomenclature 
BAM = Backshell avoidance maneuver MCO = Mars Climate Orbiter 
CFD = Computational fluid dynamics  MER = Mars Exploration Rover 
DGB = Disk gap band MOLA = Mars Orbiter Laser Altimeter 
EDL = Entry, descent, and landing MPL = Mars Polar Lander 
EGSE = Electronic ground support equipment MSP = Mars Surveyor Program 
HS = Heatshield RCS = Reaction control system 
I. Introduction 
n May 25th, 2008 at 23:38 UTC, the Phoenix Mars Lander made the first successful powered landing on Mars 
since the Viking landings three decades earlier.1  The eruption of cheers and applause in the control room 
following the first indication of a successful touchdown were more than ten years in the making, having begun in 
1997 during a different, faster, better, cheaper era of planetary space flight.  Originally born as NASA’s Mars 
Surveyor Program 2001 Lander, the spacecraft and mission lived through the assembly and test phase, but then was 
canceled following the successive losses of its cousin spacecraft the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) and Mars Polar 
Lander (MPL) in 1999.  Lying essentially dormant and partially complete in storage at the location of its creation, 
the Lockheed Martin Space Systems facility in Littleton, Colorado, it literally rose from the ashes of the Mars 
Surveyor Program when it was reborn as Phoenix in 2003, as part of NASA’s Mars Scout Program. 
Through the years from the inception of the Mars 2001 Lander to the landing of the spacecraft as Phoenix, the 
design of the entry, descent and landing (EDL) architecture, as well as the spacecraft itself, evolved in response to 
changing mission design and focused efforts to enhance spacecraft system robustness.  What follows in this paper is 
a chronicling of the evolution of the design and design drivers, as well as an overview of the entry, descent and 
landing architecture that provided the historic first landing in the northern polar region of Mars. 
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II. Basic Elements of Phoenix EDL System 
The basic elements of the Phoenix EDL system remain unchanged from the original Mars 2001 Lander.  As 
shown in Fig. 1, the spacecraft arrives at Mars in the Pre-Entry Configuration, which consists of a cruise stage and 
entry vehicle.  The cruise stage, which provides solar power and navigation functions during the cruise to Mars, is 
jettisoned prior to atmospheric entry, leaving the Entry Configuration.  More than 99% of the Mars relative energy 
possessed by the vehicle is removed via entry configuration atmospheric drag during hypersonic and supersonic 
flight.  At target deploy conditions, a Viking heritage disk-gap-band (DBG) supersonic parachute is deployed.  This 
Parachute Configuration further reduces the energy of the EDL system, while carrying out key activities in 
preparation for terminal descent.  These activities include jettison of the entry vehicle heatshield (HS) exposing the 
lander inside the entry vehicle.  Heatshield jettison is followed by lander leg deploy and radar power on.  The radar 
is used for both altimetry and velocimetry and is a key element of the landing system.  This configuration is shown 
in Fig. 1 as the Post HS & Leg Deploy Configuration.  Upon reaching a desired velocity/altitude state, the lander 
separates from the parachute/backshell and begins using a system of 12 pulsed thrusters to perform a gravity turn 
powered descent.  Touchdown and engine cutoff occurs when one of three landing legs contacts the ground.  The 
Terminal Descent Configuration is the fifth illustration shown in Fig.  
 
 
Figure 1. Basic elements of the Phoenix entry, descent and landing system. 
 
III. Mars 2001 Lander vs. Phoenix: Mission Design Differences 
The original Mars 2001 Lander mission design differed from the Phoenix mission design in a number of key 
ways.  Orbital mechanics of the 2001 launch opportunity led to a Mars 2001 Lander inertial atmospheric entry 
velocity of 7.0 km/s.  The Phoenix launch opportunity led to a less energetic and less stressing inertial entry velocity 
of 5.6 km/s.  The science goals of the two missions also led to two very different landing regions.  While the Mars 
2001 Lander was planned to target the equatorial region of Mars, the Phoenix landing site is on the northern plains 
of Mars.  This difference resulted in a significant difference in landing site elevation between the two missions.  The 
Mars 2001 Lander was required to land at a highest elevation of +2.5 km relative to the MOLA reference areoid, 
more than any previous mission, while the Phoenix landing site is at -4.1 km relative to the MOLA areoid.  A 
difference of more than 6 km provided Phoenix a more comfortable EDL timeline.  Finally, because of the relative 
homogeneity and benign character of the Phoenix landing site and to reduce EDL complexity, the use of hypersonic 
guidance in the original 2001 design to reduce landed footprint size was descoped for Phoenix.  Table 1 provides a 
list of defining differences between the two mission EDL architectures.  In the following sections, the process and 
design drivers that led to the final Phoenix design are described in more detail. 
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Table 1.  Comparison of 2001 Mars Lander and Phoenix EDL Architectures. 
  EDL Architectural Feature 2001 Mars Lander EDLDesign Value
Phoenix EDL
Design Value
  Inertial Entry Velocity 7.0 km/s 5.6 km/s
  Inertial Entry Flight Path Angle -12.5º -13.0º
  Hypersonic/Supersonic Flight Apollo Guidance Ballistic Trajectory
  Peak Heating 79 W/cm2 46.1 W/cm2
  Peak Deceleration 10.5 Earth G's 9.3 Earth G's
  Parachute Deploy Dynamic Pressure 625 Pa 490 Pa
  Parachute Deploy Altitude 10.2 km 12.9 km
  Time on Parachute 117 s 173 s
  Lander Separation Height 1040 m 940 m
  Length of EDL Phase 369 s 440 s
  Landing Site Location Equatorial Polar
  Max. Landing Site Elevation (w.r.t MOLA) +2.5 km -4.1 km
 
 
IV. The Evolution of the Phoenix EDL Architecture 
The following section describes the key evolutionary steps in the design of the Phoenix EDL architecture, 
beginning with the design originating from the Phoenix proposal, and concluding with the design actually flown to 
Mars.  Having lineage to the lost Mars Polar Lander, the very first Phoenix EDL design drivers were rooted in the 
findings of the Mars Polar Lander Failure Review Board and the 2001 Mars Lander Return to Flight 
recommendations.  These included addressing a touchdown indicator flight software bug that was identified as the 
most probable cause of the MPL failure.  Additionally, design changes to the radar were also identified and 
incorporated into the original Phoenix EDL design, and EDL UHF communication capability was also added, as 
were other more minor changes all of which were targeted at enhancing the robustness of the Phoenix EDL system. 
A. Phoenix EDL Architecture at Inception 
At the beginning of the Phoenix project, the EDL architecture resembled strongly the Mars 2001 Lander 
architecture, with the major changes being inertial entry velocity and landing site elevation.  Hypersonic 
guidancewas part of the Phoenix baseline at the inception of the project.  Figure 2 shows the baseline Phoenix EDL 
architecture as it existed in late 2004.  
 
Lander Prep
Parachute• Radar Activated: E+264s, L- 206s, 12 km
• Heat Shield Jettison: E+260s, L-210s, 12 km, < 286 m/s
• Parachute Deployment: E+250s, L-220s, 13 km, Mach 1.5-1.7 
• Peak Heating: E+100s, L-370s, 45 km, Peak Deceleration: E+120s, L-350s, 9.5g 
• Cruise Stage Separation: E-5min
• Lander Separation: E+440s, L-30s, 0.74 km, 60 m/s
• Throttle Up: E+443s, L-27s, 0.57 km
• Constant Velocity Achieved: E+465s, L-5s, 0.012 km, 1.6 m/s
• Touchdown: E+470s, L-0s, 0 km, 1.6 m/s
• Entry Turn Starts: E-6.5 min.  Turn completed by E-5min.
• Leg Deployments: E+290s, L-180s, 10 km
• Dust Settling: L+0 to L+15 min
Landing at 
-3.5 to -5.0 km
Elevation 
(MOLA relative)
Entry Prep
•Fire Pyros for Deployments: L+5sec
• Begin Gyro-Compassing: L+85min
• Solar Array Deploy:  L+15min
* Altitude referenced to equatorial radius
• Final EDL Parameter Update: E-3hr 
Terminal Descent
Guided
Descent
• Entry: E-0s, L-470s, 125 km*,r=3522.2 km, 5.7 km/s, γ = -12.5 °
 
Figure 2. Phoenix EDL architecture and sequence of events as it existed in late 2004. 
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B. Changes to Parachute Deploy Dynamic Pressure, Parachute Diameter, and Parachute Deploy Trigger  
The original Mars 2001 Lander parachute deployment trigger was a velocity trigger that used Mars relative 
velocity propagated from entry minus 10 minutes using onboard accelerometers.  When the trigger velocity 
condition was achieved, the parachute was deployed.  An assessment early in the Phoenix project of the loads on the 
lander at parachute deployment showed low or negative margin.  Because the loads at parachute deployment are 
proportional to dynamic pressure, an effort was undertaken to reduce the dynamic pressure condition at parachute 
deployment. 
The first step in the dynamic pressure reduction was a simple reduction in a target parachute deployment 
velocity.  By reducing the velocity, the dynamic pressure is also reduced; however, there is a limiting factor to this 
approach.  Pushing back on deploy velocity reduction is the desire to avoid being at or near a transonic condition at 
parachute deployment.  As the entry vehicle approaches the parachute deployment velocity state, it is in supersonic 
flight below Mach 2.  The aerodynamic behavior of the blunt body vehicle enters a dynamic instability region as it 
approaches Mach 1.  This aerodynamic instability causes the capsule angle of attack to oscillate at a growing rate.  
Two considerations come into play with this growing oscillation: parachute qualification tests and vehicle dynamics 
after parachute deploy.  The Phoenix Viking heritage DBG supersonic parachute was qualified to deploy at angles of 
attack at or less than 13º (from Viking flights), therefore the parachute must be deployed prior to oscillations of this 
magnitude.  Equally dependant on parachute deploy angle of attack magnitude is the excitation of an oscillation 
mode dubbed the “wrist mode”.  The wrist mode is the oscillation of the lander about the parachute attachment point 
while hanging below the parachute.  A parachute deployment at a large angle of attack causes the application of a 
large load on the lander in a direction not aligned with the lander center of mass.  This orientation leads to a large 
torque on the vehicle at parachute deployment and produces an undesirable high rate wrist mode following 
parachute deployment.  Both parachute qualification limits and wrist mode excitation bound the extent to which 
parachute deployment velocity can be lowered.  Due to these constraints, one additional modification was made to 
increase the structural margin of the lander: the parachute diameter was decreased from 13.41 m to 11.73 m to 
further reduce the loads imparted onto the lander. 
Having both lowered the target parachute deployment velocity, thereby lowering the parachute dynamic 
pressure, and reduced the parachute diameter, an effort was also undertaken to reduce the dynamic pressure 
dispersion at parachute deploy.  Through Monte Carlos analysis, dispersion of parachute deployment dynamic 
pressure can be assessed as a function of dispersion of atmospheric density, accelerometer performance and 
knowledge of entry vehicle drag.  All of these dispersions and uncertainties lead to a dispersion of the parachute 
deployment dynamic pressure.  It was determined through this analysis that a parachute trigger based on 
acceleration, rather than velocity, was capable of producing a smaller dynamic pressure dispersion at parachute 
deployment.  Because dynamic pressure is directly proportional to acceleration, acceleration can be used as a 
measurement of dynamic pressure, with uncertainties incorporated for vehicle mass and vehicle drag.  This approach 
was used successfully on the Mars Exploration Rover landings.  Thus, Phoenix incorporated an acceleration trigger 
into its parachute deployment trigger, so that the final resulting parachute deployment trigger flown by Phoenix was 
a hybrid trigger using either acceleration or velocity as a trigger point, but tuned so that statistically the trigger was 
very likely to deploy on acceleration.  This implementation allowed the parachute deploy dynamic pressure 
condition to be both lower and tighter in dispersion, thereby reducing loads on the lander at deployment while 
keeping the deployment state comfortably away from the transonic region. 
C. Removal of Hypersonic Guidance 
A modified version of the Apollo hypersonic guidance system used by the Apollo command module during earth 
re-entry was part of the Mars 2001 Lander design.  Incorporated as a technology demonstration, the Mars 2001 
Lander development simulations showed the possibility of achieving a 10 km landed footprint, much smaller than a 
landed footprint for an unguided, ballistic entry.  Under the ambitious timeline of the Mars Surveyor Program, the 
Mars 2001 Lander would be flown just prior to precursor missions for Mars Sample Return that would require 
precision landing made possible by hypersonic guidance.  It thus was reasonable that the 2001 Mars Lander should 
demonstrate hypersonic guidance for the first time at Mars. 
When the spacecraft was reborn as Phoenix, the ambitions of the Mars Surveyor Program had subsequently been 
discarded being replaced by a new Mars exploration timeline.  The rationale for Phoenix to retain hypersonic 
guidance capability thus became ambiguous, and such was the state at the beginning of the Phoenix project.  Driven 
in large part by design momentum from the Mars 2001 Lander project, the Phoenix project retained hypersonic 
guidance for more than a year of its existence.  However, there were two main considerations that eventually led to 
the capability being discarded: design complexity and landing site characterization.   
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As part of the Mars Scout Program, Phoenix was carried out under a limited, fixed cost budget.  In such a 
situation, the development of a new, complex capability like hypersonic guidance was difficult to characterize 
leading to significant cost risk.  While implementation was fairly straightforward, the approach to adequately test 
and verify the capability was not fully understood.  Combined with concurrent landing site characterization work 
showing a relatively homogeneous and benign landing region, both the lack of need for and practicality of 
hypersonic guidance led to its removal from the Phoenix EDL architecture in 2005. 
Having removed hypersonic guidance, the Phoenix engineering team was left with the question of what would 
serve as an optimal and robust replacement.  Because the vehicle was designed for hypersonic guidance, it had 
incorporated in its design a center of mass offset.  This offset produced a trim angle of attack of about 3º that 
generated lift, the direction of which was steered by the guidance system to produce downtrack/crosstrack 
maneuvering.  With the guidance system descoped, the engineering team had the option to retain the vehicle trim 
angle and lift (similar to Viking), or rebalance the vehicle and change it into a purely ballistic spacecraft.  A trade 
study was undertaken to assess new baseline options, the outcome of which was to change the hypersonic/supersonic 
phase of the EDL architecture into a lifting trajectory.  This first evolutionary step is shown in Fig. 3.  This choice 
retained the vehicle center of mass offset and fixed the resulting lift in an upward direction, and was deemed 
desirable by much of the engineering team in part because it resulted in the smallest design change while removing 
the complexities of hypersonic guidance.  It also had the benefit of raising the Mach number at parachute 
deployment, thereby operating the system further away from the transonic region and the aerodynamic instability.  A 
significant down side of the design decision was a large growth in landed footprint to 250 km.  This can also be seen 
in Fig. 3.  The lifting architecture was retained with the knowledge that concern about surface landing hazards might 
eventually drive the need for footprint reduction, and indeed this did happen in late 2005. 
 
Guided Trajectory
(Ballistic Reference)
Lifting Trajectory Ballistic Trajectory
-12.5 EFPA -12.5 EFPA
-13.0 EFPA
2005 20082004
10 km 250 km 110 km
Redesign Drivers
-Reduced footprint
12.7 km12.6 km
7.5 km
Mach 1.18
(99% Low)
Mach 1.37
(99% Low)
Mach 1.45
(99% Low)
Flight MassAllocation MassAllocation Mass
430 Pa
430 Pa 490 Pa
Redesign Drivers
-Reduced complexity
-Higher chute deploy Mach 
& altitude
-Small design delta
 
Figure 3. Evolution of the Phoenix EDL hypersonic/supersonic phase. 
 
Given the directive to reduce landed footprint, another trade study was undertaken to do a fresh assessment of 
not only trajectory options, but also entry flight path angle options.  Fig. 4 illustrates the formulation of the trade 
study.  A performance trade space was established with dimensions in entry flight path angle and trajectory type.  A 
follow-on implementation trade space assessed attitude control options, whether a spinning entry vehicle as was the 
case for the Mars Exploration Rovers, or a 3-axis actively stabilized vehicle as was the case for Viking and MPL.  
The results of the trade study established a 3-axis stabilized ballistic entry at a slightly steepened -13.0º entry flight 
path angle as the Phoenix baseline.  This design remained the baseline for the remainder of the project and was the 
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architecture flown on landing day.  It provided an adequately reduced landed footprint size (approx. 110 km), while 
providing sufficient margin and risk balance.  This final evolutionary step is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 4. EDL architecture trade space that established the as-flown baseline design. 
D. Terminal Descent and Augmentation of Landing Radar 
Once the parachute has been successfully deployed, the lander must autonomously decide when to separate from 
the parachute and begin propulsive descent.  This event is a critical decision with little margin for error.  If 
separation occurs too early in the trajectory, the lander will run out of propellant prior to reaching the surface of 
Mars.  If separation occurs too late in the trajectory, the lander will not have enough time to slow down to a safe 
touchdown velocity.  To further complicate matters, the propagated entry state used to deploy the parachute was not 
accurate enough to make this separation decision.  Instead the lander must use another sensor - a landing radar - to 
provide the altitude and velocity knowledge required for a successful separation and touchdown.  The performance 
of this sensor thus becomes critical to the success of the mission. 
The landing radar used by Phoenix was originally selected by the Mars Survey Program (MSP) for the Mars 
Polar Lander (MPL) mission, and augments a commercial F-16 altimeter with a velocimeter and an array of 
electronically steerable antennas.  The radar provides altitude and three-axis velocity measurements from 
approximately 2 km to 15 meters above the surface. 
The Phoenix mission identified early on the need for additional testing of the MSP-derived landing radar.  The 
performance of the radar was a prime failure mode identified in the MPL design, and as such received considerable 
attention by the Phoenix EDL team.  A wide ranging test program was performed, using three complementary test 
venues: helicopter field tests with a flight-spare radar, bench-level Electronic Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) 
tests with the flight radar, and a high-fidelity computer simulation of the integrated system.  While it is impossible to 
test the radar on Earth in the same environment it will experience on landing day, the combinations of these test 
venues allowed the team to perform an unprecedented analysis of the radar performance. 
The test program uncovered many problems and idiosyncrasies with the radar performance, most with 
straightforward mitigations.  However, in December of 2006, a serious problem was discovered using the high-
fidelity software simulation. 
Under the original EDL timeline, shown in Fig. 2, the radar begins searching for the ground 4 sec after the 
separation of the heatshield.  The team had long been aware that due to the close proximity of the heatshield at radar 
power on, the radar may initially lock onto the heatshield yielding erroneous measurements.  In response, the 
Phoenix Flight Software (FSW) was modified to include a check on the altitude change - if the altitude is increasing, 
the radar must be locked onto the heatshield falling away from the lander instead of the ground closing in on the 
lander.  However, the radar test program uncovered an even more insidious and difficult to resolve interaction.  
Under certain very specific conditions, the high-fidelity simulations showed the radar erroneously classifying a 
return signal from the heatshield as a return signal from the ground.  In response to this mis-classification, the radar 
would return an altitude that was a full 5 km lower than the true altitude, and decreasing instead of increasing - thus 
fooling our heatshield lockup mitigation.  An error of that magnitude would lead to certain mission failure. 
The first response by the team was to delay the power on of the landing radar by an additional 40 sec to increase 
separation between the lander and the heatshield.  However, timeline changes alone could not remove the 
vulnerability - the radar firmware had to be modified, a mere three months prior to launch.  The updated radar 
firmware pushed the region of vulnerability outside of the expected Phoenix trajectory.  
E. Turn to Entry and Cruise Stage Separation 
In 2006, trajectory analysis raised concerns about a potential for cruise stage re-contact with the Phoenix entry 
vehicle during flight through the atmosphere of Mars.  At the time, as shown in Fig. 2, the baseline sequence of 
events included a turn to entry attitude seven minutes prior to entry, and separation of the cruise stage five minutes 
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prior to entry.  With the entry vehicle and cruise stage attitudes both aligned with the entry trajectory at the time of 
separation, the cruise stage simply follows the entry vehicle into Mars’ atmosphere on the same trajectory.  Only the 
separation rate produced by the separation event establishes a distance between the two vehicles during the five 
minutes between separation and atmospheric interface.  Once in the atmosphere, the difference between the vehicle 
ballistic coefficients (Beta) creates divergence in their paths. 
A thorough analysis of the potential for recontact of the vehicles included establishing a cruise stage break-up 
timeline through aerothermal methods, and understanding the trajectory of the resulting pieces from the break-up.  
This analysis established the potential for break-up pieces with high ballistic coefficients to overtake and impact the 
Phoenix entry vehicle.  Analysis showed a catch-up and overtake miss distance as low as 6 m.  Given the uncertainty 
in the analysis, 6 m can be considered an impact. 
An immediate solution to the issue might seem to be a repositioning of cruise stage separation earlier in the 
Phoenix timeline allowing the vehicles more time to achieve a larger and safe separation distance prior to entry into 
the atmosphere.  However, because the Phoenix entry vehicle is powered by a battery of fixed capacity, loss of the 
solar array charging capability on the cruise stage after separation causes a negative battery power state by the time 
of landing.  An early separation within the power limitation of the battery did not provide a reliable solution. 
The simple design of the Phoenix landing system uses a single reaction control system (RCS) packaged on the 
lander and exited through the aeroshell.  This RCS system is used both during the cruise to Mars and during EDL.  
Because the system is part of the lander system itself, the option to turn the entry vehicle to entry attitude after cruise 
stage separation existed, and indeed this is the solution chosen by the Phoenix engineering team.  Prior to the turn to 
entry, the Phoenix spacecraft is in the sun point attitude keeping its solar arrays in full sunlight.  This attitude is 46º 
from the entry attitude.  By separating the cruise stage first before performing the turn to entry, the cruise stage is 
given a component of velocity in the cross-trajectory direction by the separation event.  The results of a break-up 
analysis for this scenario are shown in Fig. 5, which plots the separation distance time history between the cruise 
stage and the entry vehicle. The closest approach by an overtaking, high ballistic coefficient piece of the cruise stage 
is observed to be at a distance greater than 200 m from the entry vehicle.  This result was deemed a sufficient 
outcome for the Phoenix mission, and thus the baseline was changed such that the cruise stage is first separated at 
seven minutes prior to entry, followed by a turn to entry attitude that completes by five minutes prior to entry. 
 
Figure 5. Cruise stage re-contact separation distances for separation in sun point attitude. 
F. Addition of the Backshell Avoidance Maneuver 
A failure of high regret on landing day would be to successfully execute a landing only to have the parachute 
follow the lander to the ground and drape the lander, effectively ending the mission.  The backshell avoidance 
maneuver (BAM) was added to the Phoenix EDL architecture to avoid such a scenario.   
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Tip-Up and Gravity Turn Tip-Up and Gravity Turn
With BAM
20052004
Extra delta-v in upwind 
direction
BAM angle
Small Magnitude Wind
 
Figure 6. Backshell avoidance maneuver. 
 
In cases of low wind or no wind at altitudes below 1 km, the gravity turn powered descent performed by the 
Phoenix lander effectively becomes a straight down vertical descent.  Having separated from the lander at about 1 
km, with effectively no wind, the parachute/backshell system will follow the lander to the ground landing on or very 
near it.  This scenario is shown on the left side of Fig. 6.  In higher wind cases at separation from the 
parachute/backshell, the combined system will have a horizontal velocity at or near the wind velocity.  By 
definition, the gravity turn descent will arrest the lander’s horizontal velocity bringing it to zero upon landing.  The 
parachute/backshell, however, will retain the horizontal velocity and move downwind away from the lander.  This 
situation provides an inherent mitigation of parachute draping risk.  The BAM is designed to provide horizontal 
separation velocity when none or too little is provided by wind.  This mitigation is achieved by augmenting the 
attitude tip-up maneuver that occurs three seconds after lander separation.  Without the BAM, this tip-up is used to 
align the lander’s thrust direction with the lander’s velocity in preparation to execute the gravity turn.  However, 
when the separation velocity is below a BAM threshold velocity, the tip-up maneuver is augmented to rotate beyond 
the velocity direction thereby adding horizontal velocity to the lander.  This added velocity takes the lander upwind 
of the parachute and provides separation to prevent parachute draping of the lander.  This scenario is shown on the 
right side of Fig 6. 
G. Thruster Efficacy and Change in Attitude Control Deadbands 
Approximately nine months before launch, an issue arose concerning the 
effectiveness of the RCS thrusters when used in flight through the atmosphere.  These 
thrusters are used for pitch, yaw and roll attitude control from start of EDL to 
parachute deployment.  The behavior of the thrusters themselves was not at issue, 
rather it was the impact of the thruster plumes on the aerodynamic flowfield 
surrounding the entry vehicle during hypersonic and supersonic flight that was of 
concern.  Figure 7 illustrates the issue.  As shown in the illustration, the RCS thruster 
exits are located on the backshell of the entry vehicle.  When the thrusters are fired 
inside the atmosphere and at supersonic and hypersonic velocities, the thruster plume 
modifies the aerodynamic flowfield around the entry vehicle, which alters the pressure 
on the surface of the backshell.  For Phoenix, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) 
analysis showed that the modification of pressure resulted in a resultant torque on the 
vehicle that was opposite in direction from the expected torque generated from firing 
the RCS thruster.2  This situation is obviously undesirable.  For the Phoenix 
configuration, CFD analysis was not able to resolve with certainty the 
magnitude of this effect.  The minimum impact of the effect was a resulting 
smaller net torque generated by firing a thruster than desired.  However, for the 
yaw axis in particular for Phoenix, CFD analysis could not rule out the possibility of a resulting net torque in the 
Figure 7.  Thruster efficacy. 
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opposite direction from the desired torque.  This situation could result in torque reversal, which if experienced for a 
prolonged period of time, could cause the attitude control system to drive the entry vehicle to undesirable attitude 
oscillations. 
Faced with the limitations of the analysis techniques to clearly show the expected net torque on the entry vehicle 
resulting from the use of the RCS system while in the atmosphere, the Phoenix engineering team could not come to 
a crisp technical solution.  However, trajectory analysis did show that, with tighter control at the top of the trajectory 
prior to the regime of concern, the Phoenix entry vehicle did possess sufficient inherent aerodynamic stability to 
traverse the flight through the atmosphere and meet required conditions at parachute deployment without use of the 
RCS system, and without passively spinning as did the MER and Pathfinder entry vehicles.  The strategy for use of 
the RCS system then became that of a safety net.  The control deadbands on the attitude controller were widened so 
that only in extreme situations, when the entry vehicle attitude behavior approaches limits of spacecraft capability, 
would the RCS system be used to dampen attitude behavior.  Table 2 shows the attitude and attitude rate deadbands 
both for the initial Phoenix design and for the as-flown values developed after the thruster efficacy issue led to a 
change. 
Table 2. Comparison of Initial Attitude Deadband Design vs. As-Flown Deadband Design. 
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  Hypersonic 2  (Start at 0.294 m/s2) 1.7 2.0 2.0 inf 15.0 15.0 0.03 1.0 1.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
  Hypersonic 3  (5.3 km/s - 3.8 km/s) 1.7 10.0 10.0 inf 15.0 15.0 0.03 50.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
  Hypersonic 4  (3.8 km/s - 1.0 km/s) 1.7 10.0 10.0 inf 15.0 15.0 0.03 50.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
  Hypersonic 5  (1.0 km/s - 0.62 km/s) 1.7 5.0 5.0 inf 15.0 15.0 0.03 0.5 3.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
  Pre-Chute      (Start at 0.62 m/s) 1.7 5.0 5.0 inf 15.0 15.0 0.03 0.5 3.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
EDL Sub-Phase
Initial Design
Attitude (deg) Attitude Rate (deg/s)
As Flown Initial Design As Flown
 
 
V. As Flown Architecture 
The preceding sections provided an overview of the significant changes made to the Phoenix EDL architecture.  
Figure 8 outlines the resulting as-flown architecture.  Comparison of Fig. 8 with Fig. 2 illustrates the modifications 
that were required from the Mars 2001 Lander to the final flight day process. On May 25, 2008 this ballistic, 
balanced architecture provided a very successful powered landing on the northern plains of Mars. Reference 3 
provides an overview of the reconstruction analysis performed for the actual Phoenix entry, descent, and landing. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Final as-flown Phoenix EDL architecture. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Over the course of five years from the selection of Phoenix to landing day in 2008, the Phoenix EDL architecture 
went through a variety of changes.  From simple changes driven by mission design differences to action taken in 
response to technical difficulties or robustness augmentation, major architectural changes were made.  Mission 
design differences drove the entry velocity and landing site elevation, both of which proved less stressing to the 
EDL system than the original Mars 2001 Lander mission design.  A desire for added robustness and simplification 
drove changes to both the parachute design and the parachute deployment algorithm, as well as the removal of 
hypersonic guidance and the addition of the backshell avoidance maneuver.  The technical discovery of the RCS 
thruster efficacy issue led to a change in attitude control strategy.  All these changes led to a robust EDL architecture 
that resulted in a successful landing on the northern plains of Mars.  
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